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FOREWORD: KICKING OVER THE TRACES
OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
LINDA R. HIRSHMAN*

[E]very community is established with a view to some good.... 1
I don't think Chicago was the place Aristotle had in mind.
This year's Seventh Circuit 2 Symposium is about the efforts of the
courts of the Seventh Circuit to compel Chicago to live up to that notion
of the good embodied in national constitutional law. As reflected in
Anthony Lukas' story of the federal courts' attempt to desegregate the
Boston school system,3 Chicago is not the only American community to
have felt the lash of the life-tenured federal judiciary on its political skin.
It is, however, at least arguably, the place where the communal mores
were the furthest from the constitutional norms, and it is certainly the
site of the most varied efforts to invoke the federal courts to narrow that
gap.
The three subjects of this symposium are, by many accounts, 4 the
most creative and effective examples of the courts' efforts: Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority5 (the public housing case); Shakman v. Democratic Organization6 (the patronage case) and Ketchum v. Byrne 7 (the
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., Cornell University; J.D.
University of Chicago. Apologies to Professor Michelman (Michelman, Foreword. Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986)).
1. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE § 1252al, bk. I, at 1 (J.
Barnes ed., R. Jowett trans. 1984).
2. By Seventh Circuit, the undertaking includes all the federal district courts in the three
states encompassed by the circuit as well as the Court of Appeals itself.
3. J.A. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985).
4. W. & L. GRANGER, LORDS OF THE LAST MACHINE: THE STORY OF POLITICS IN CHICAGO
174 (1987); Chi. Trib., May 18, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Chi. Trib., Oct. 23, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
5. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. I11.1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 342 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974); Gautreaux v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. 11. 1974); Gautreaux v. Landrieux, 523 F. Supp. 684
(N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
6. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 435 F.2d 267 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Shakman v. Democratic Org., 533 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 858 (1976); Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
For additional history of this case, see Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987).
7. Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); see
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1980 ward remap case). We are enormously fortunate in this look at the
more than two decades of litigation to have an architect of each of the
challenges to tell the story--of the legal and social goals the litigants and
lawyers sought to accomplish and how the structure of the federal court
system generally and the particular structure and personality of the federal courts of the Seventh Circuit affected their tasks.
Alexander Polikoff, Executive Director of Business and Professional
People for the Public Interest, tells us of the more than two decades of
litigation over the integration of public housing in Chicago 8-from
Mayor Daley's efforts to deal out Dr. King's marches in 1966 to the 1986
Northwestern study of low-income black children attending white suburban schools: "This school makes my child equal with others .... [In
Chicago,] Victoria wanted to be white .... I caught her putting baby
powder all over her body once .... Now that we are here [in a mixed

school,] black or white, ugly is ugly." 9 C. Richard Johnson, one of the
original Shakman lawyers, tells of the efforts to dismantle the touchstone
of Chicago political society-the pervasive system of patronage employment, including at one time up to 40,000 Democratic patronage jobs in
Cook County.' 0 Jeffrey Colman and Michael Brody tell of the litigation
resulting from a triple play by the legislative branches of state and local
government after the 1980 census, in which the federal courts (1) imposed a congressional redistricting plan for Illinois, (2) found that the
state Legislative Redistricting Commission's plan for representation in
the state legislature intentionally discriminated against blacks and
(3) oversaw four years of litigation over the Chicago ward map until the
parties finally concluded a "settlement map" under the gun of a heavy
federal mandate."
Well, the good news first or the bad news first? As any sentient
adult Chicagoan knows, the result of the courts' orders to build public
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); In re Illinois Congressional Dists. Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Cousins v. City
Council, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections,
574 F. Supp. 1082 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Torres v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 142 Il1.App. 3d 955, 492
N.E.2d 539 (1986).
8. Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 451 (1988) (Mr.
Polikoff's article appears in this symposium issue).
9. Id. at 475 n.128.
10. Johnson, Successful Reform Litigation: The Shakman Patronage Case, 64 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 479, 482 (1988) (Mr. Johnson's article appears in this symposium issue).
11. Colman & Brody, Ketchum v. Byrne: The Hard Lessons of DiscriminatoryRedistrictingin
Chicago, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 497 (1988) (Messrs. Colman and Brody's article appears in this

symposium issue).
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housing outside the black ghetto effectively ended the construction of
public housing in the city.' 2 A much less ambitious remedy ordering
rent subsidies in federally subsidized housing in the city and suburbs for
a limited number of black families who were willing to move (the "Gautreaux Demonstration Program") has generally been considered successful, but only 3300 families have been affected. By contrast, Dick Johnson
points to the courts' attack on the patronage system as a major factor in
the emergence of an organized black political movement, as well as to the
evidence, two decades later, of dramatically increased political competition even in elections for offices like ward committeemen and judges,
where the non-patronage factors of race and television coverage are not
heavily involved.1 3 Finally, alluding to Chicago's reputation as "Beirut
on the Lake" from the years when the city-wide elections produced a
black mayor while the gerrymandered city council remained mostly
white, Colman and Brody conclude: "The paralyzing polarization of the
City Council ended with the special elections ordered by the court in
1986 as part of the remedy to the City Council's illegal 1981
14
redistricting."
One would have thought the lesson fairly clear: John Ely's very
restrained role for the federal judiciary is right,' 5 and the federal courts
should confine themselves to process-based actions clearing the channels
to political change. Thus, the relative successes of the patronage and
voting rights cases are perfect examples of how the process should work.
But non-process-based efforts, which, like Gautreaux, impose substantive
social change through constitutional adjudication are arguably illegitimate and unassailably imprudent.' 6 Indeed, when I put this Symposium
together, I would have bet money that's where everyone would come
down.
One might have expected, for example, that after the extraordinarily
successful resistance to his decades-long efforts at social change, Al Polikoff would have given up. After all, it didn't even take a decade for most
Americans to tire of the Sixties. Instead, Polikoff concludes:
It is a prudential question for judges to decide in each case where to
strike the balance between trying too much and trying too little. But it
may come at some cost to the judiciary, and to society, if the decision
is never to try at all. Though courts may preserve respect by not undertaking what they are ill-fitted to do, they may lose respect by ap12. Polikoff, supra note 8, at 459.
13. Johnson, supra note 10, at 493-94.
14. Colman & Brody, supra note 11, at 499.
15. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181-83 (1980).

16. Id.
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pearing to be powerless to undertake any remedy of adjudicated
wrongs. Democracy cannot thrive in a bed of cynicism, and a perception of powerlessness to undertake remedies may undermine respect
for the judiciary just as much as a perception of inability to carry out
remedial undertakings. The issues may be particularly acute in housing discrimination, an area that poses an especially challenging problem for America. We may close by putting the Gautreaux case into
this somewhat larger frame.17
Our lead article, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, by one of the most
thoughtful current scholars of the role of judges and remedial jurisprudence, Peter M. Shane,1s also declines the counsel of Ely's way. To the
contrary, Shane argues from the three Chicago cases, among others, for a
very activist jurisprudence of constitutional rights, distinguishing the
conservative formulations stemming over the years from Circuit Judges
Easterbrook and Posner as well as from recent Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork. Shane calls his version of the court's role "'aspirationalism'-viewing the Constitution as a signal of the kind of government
under which we would like to live." 19 Noting that even a judge little
inclined to aspirationalism will often face cases of institutional change
(for instance, where Congress has unmistakably delegated the job to the
courts, as in the Voting Rights Act 20 ), Shane also proposes standards for
remedial relief designed to circumvent some of the problems illustrated
21
in the symposium examples, particularly the housing case. None of his
suggestions, however, includes refusing to act.
Commenting specifically on the court's role in the patronage litigation, David Strauss suggests that our thinking about the judicial role may
have to change. 22 No longer a neutral law-giver in a hierarchical structure, the local federal judge will be more autonomous, bureaucratic and
of
responsive to local conditions. Strauss suggests there may be less "rule
23
law" in this new mode, yet he too anticipates continued reform.
Dan Tarlock comes closest to biting the bullet. Commenting on the
Gautreaux litigation and, more broadly, on the provision of publicly
17.

Polikoff, supra note 8, at 476-77.

18. In addition to Shane, Rights, Remedies and Restraint, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531 (1988)
[hereinafter Shane, Rights], the reader is recommended to Professor Shane's extraordinarily sensible
and humane treatment of these knotty problems in Shane, School DesegregationRemedies and the
FairGovernanceof Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041 (1984); see also Shane, Legal Disagreementand
Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71
MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
19. Shane, Rights, supra note 18, at 550.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973a-1973dd6 (1982).
21. Shane, Rights, supra note 18, at 570-71.
22. Strauss, Legality, Activism and the PatronageCase, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.585 (1988) (Professor Strauss' article appears in this symposium issue).
23. Id. at 603.
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funded housing in general, he suggests that the difficulties the courts experienced in imposing constitutional norms of racial equality may pale
24
when compared to the failure of the public housing program altogether.
Tarlock, like the other commentators, counsels some continued judicial
involvement; unlike them, his focus goes beyond the immediate problem
25
of racial equality to the knottier problem of class.
In this Foreword I want to try to fit the issues raised in this Symposium into a broader political and jurisprudential frame. Specifically, it
seems to me that one might fruitfully consider this Symposium in the
context of a wave of resistance to legal positivism and the pessimism
about the propriety of institutional litigation. 26 That resistance, which I
call "Postmodern Jurisprudence, ' 27 has been gathering for some time
and rose to public awareness during the confirmation hearings of Robert
Bork. 28 The resistance has many strands; in the context of this Foreword, I will confine my efforts to describing such aspects as relate to the
29
particular subject of the Symposium; that is, the Chicago trilogy.
The first matter seems to be why the Chicago experience doesn't
confirm John Ely's prudent majoritarianism. After all, Peter Shane
doesn't live here,30 and Alexander Polikoff may just suffer from an unnaturally elevated level of optimism. Colman and Johnson, having
cleared the channels of political change, let the people rule. This is, of
course, a particularly exquisite problem for Chicago. Governed by Richard J. Daley and the Democratic Party of Cook County for a recordbreaking two decades, the city government was characterized by corruption,31 scandal, 32 racism,3 3 short-sightedness,3 4 economic decline, 35 and
24. Tarlock, Remedying the Irremediable: The Lessons of Gautreaux, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
573 (1988) (Professor Tarlock's article appears in this symposium issue).
25. Id. at 583.
26. Bork, Neutral Pinciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); see
also R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).

27. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudenceand the Problem ofAdministrative Discretion, 82 Nw.
U.L. REV. 646 (1988).
28. For a much extended development of the significance of the Bork defeat, see Hirshman,
Brontie Bloom, and Bork-- An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177
(1988).
29. When legal academics can't figure something out, they say it's beyond the scope of this

article. See Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1208 n.19 (1985).
30. He lives in Iowa City, Iowa. No comment.
31. W. & L. GRANGER, supra note 4, at 5-7, 102-07, 157; L. O'CONNOR, REQUIEM: THE DECLINE AND DEMISE OF MAYOR DALEY AND HIS ERA 135-37, 140-42, 157 (1977); M. RAKOVE, WE

DON'T WANT NOBODY NOBODY SENT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DALEY YEARS 113-18 (1979).
32. L. O'CONNOR, CLOUT: MAYOR DALEY AND HIS CITY 167-70, 171, 236-39, 240-48 (1975).
33. W. & L. GRANGER, supra note 4, at 134-48, 167; L. O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 178-95;
M. ROYKO, BOSS: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 129-54 (1971).

34. L. O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 239.
35. W. & L. GRANGER, supra note 4, at 167.
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just plain bad taste. 36
As the articles for this Symposium were being written, the following
events were reported in the local press: 37 three present and former employees of various Cook County public bodies alleged that five-term president of the Cook County Board and Democratic Party Chairman
38
George Dunne had traded their patronage jobs for their services
(Dunne admitted the sex but denied the patronage 39); a reluctant Mayor
was forced by public pressure to discharge aide Steve Cokely when reports of his statements that Jews are part of an international conspiracy
to rule the world surfaced in the press;4° Chicago Police and a delegation
of aldermen forcibly removed from an Art Institute show of student
work a painting of late Mayor Washington in "frilly lingerie" on grounds
of incitement to riot.41

By far the most damning indictment appeared recently in the controversial Chicago Tribune series suggesting that independent aldermen
elected to the impeccably redistricted City Council were opposing development in their wards because demographic changes might threaten
their own political base by displacing the impoverished proletariat warehoused there. 42 (Here, too, the picture is not unambiguous; the aldermen
involved claim to be waiting for development that would house rather
than displace their poorest constituents. 43)
Now, one does not give up on the idea of majoritarianism just because it's occasionally a little tacky. After all, authoritarian regimes
don't have such a great track record on sexual self-discipline, tolerance
for religious minorities and respect for free speech either. But assuming
that Peter Shane is right, and the constitutional structure allows for some
36. M. RAKOVE, supra note 31, at 217; L. O'CONNOR, supra note 32, at 124, 197-209.
37. One must note the interval under the city's first black mayor, Harold Washington, who died
in office in November, 1987. In addition to the Camelot-like reverence that has fallen, it seems
appropriate to withhold judgment here, because, as Colman and Brody, see supra note 11, so graphically point out, the racial gerrymandering of the City Council simply made it impossible for Washington to govern until after the federal courts mandated redistricting shortly before his death.
38. Chi. Trib., Apr. 29, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
39. Id., Apr. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
40. Id., May 8, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
41. Id., May 12, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 5. A young man educated in a regime with a proper regard
for training in citizenship probably wouldn't have engaged in a scatological attack on the most
decent individual to have tried to govern this unruly city in this generation. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC,
bk. IV, at 425a-425c (A. Bloom trans. 1968). On the other hand, artists are a notoriously unruly lot.
Id. at 378b-378c.
42. Chicago on Hold: The New Politicsof Poverty, Chi. Trib. Aug. 29, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; id.,
Aug. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 1, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1;
id., Sept. 4, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
43. See, e.g., id., Sept. 1, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
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mixture of representative and nonrepresentative governance, living in
Chicago certainly keeps one from romanticizing about the former.
As I mentioned earlier, in the last few years, the academy, at least,
has witnessed a growing intellectual movement to suggest alternative formulations to the strict majoritarianism of a Robert Bork or even the suggested prudence of a John Ely. In fairness, one must note, as Peter Shane
does at much greater length in his article, that there is a well-established
critique of majoritarianism from the conservative side, as well. Taking off
from the insights of theorists of legislative behavior that legislatures are
subject to capture by well-organized private interests ("public choice"),
the conservative proponents of public choice jurisprudence contend that
statutory bargains should be confined to their minimum impact, leaving
44
the maximum behavior in the unregulated private domain.
But it is the opposite development-which proposes the solution of
an increase in civic virtue, rather than a decrease in civic life-that interests me here. Passing roughly under the rubric of "civic republicanism," 45 this development in constitutional law study and teaching4 6
denies that the institutions of the federal government should be measured
only in terms of their "counter-majoritarian difficulty." ' 47 Instead, drawing on traditions of public virtue which, they assert, have an historical
pedigree as good as public choice theory, the civic republicans claim that
the constitutional enterprise included and includes the goal of cultivating
a public spirit in which private interests are subordinated to the public
good. 48 In the service of this goal, nonrepresentative and imperfectly
representative institutions were established.
The propoftents identify two concrete applications of this position.
One, the federal court should stop apologizing for its lack of a good ward
organization. 4 9 Two, the court should play a greatly stepped-up role in
enforcing genuinely deliberative democracy in Congress and in the ad44. Shane, Rights, supra note 18, at 536 nn. 17-19 (citing Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Power of the Judiciary,7 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1984); Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1982)).
45. Although obviously sharing many of its concerns, it is fair to note that Shane markedly
eschews the language of civic republicanism.
46. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986);
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
47. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-28 (2d ed. 1986).
48. Sunstein, supra note 46.
49. Id. at 79 n.62; Ackerman, supra note 46, at 1030, 1043, 1070-71; Michelman, supra note 46.
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ministrative agencies,5 0 by, for example, enforcing more stringent standards of rationality review, 5' examining legislative justifications in such
review to see if they are only a guise for enshrining existing power relations, 52 and applying more demanding review techniques to ensure public
53
values at the implementation phase.
All of this may seem rather remote from the army of patronage employees and the Robert Taylor Homes. Another shoe dropped recently,
however, in the form of a student piece in the University of Chicago Law
Review, suggesting that a civic republican approach to the Constitution
could be advanced through judicial enforcement of the guarantee
clause. 54 The requirement that "the United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government" 5 5 would
then provide the basis for the federal courts to review state action for
56
conformity with republican ideals.
To return to the local scene, it doesn't take very exotic notions of
republican ideals to justify the outcome in the case of the Voting Rights
Act. 57 Consider on the other hand, recasting the plaintiffs' (ultimately
unsuccessful) claims in the patronage hiring case, which the Seventh Circuit dismissed recently on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to show
how the incumbents' promises of patronage employment implicated
plaintiffs' free speech and association rights by putting them at a disadvantage in the political process.5 8 In lieu of the unsuccessful first amendment theory, one might envision very broad citizen standing to enforce
the claim that a civic republican form of government precludes the sale
of public office. Similarly, a civic republican theory of representative
government would go a long way toward rebutting David Strauss' speculation that selling government jobs is a constitutionally acceptable variation of interest group politics.5 9 And, as I will suggest more fully below,
50. Sunstein, supra note 46; Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988).
51. Sunstein, supra note 46, at 69.
52. Id. at 72.
53. Id. at 74.
54. Comment, The Guaranteeof Republican Government: Proposalsfor JudicialReview, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 208 (1987).
55. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
56. The conventional wisdom has been that guarantee clause claims are nonjusticiable "political questions." Cf Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962); Note, A Niche for the Guarantee Clause, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 681 (1981).

57. Indeed, there is a level at which classical republican theory is arguably at odds with the
strict equal protection interest advanced by reapportionment. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 329-30
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58. Shakman v. Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1987).
59. Strauss, supra note 22, at 591-95.
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a federal court armed with the guarantee clause might have done vastly
different things with the housing litigation, as well.
No one in the academic debate has suggested anything remotely this
sweeping. Indeed, the most obvious deficiency in the civic republicanism
movement is its lack of substantive answers to many of the problems that
confront the American community. It is probably safe to say that the
only undisputed plank of the civic republican platform is that elected
60
representatives should engage in a discourse to identify the public good.
The chief proponent of the revisionist constitutional theory-Cass Sunstein-remains very process-oriented, his suggestions to date being focused on clearing the channels to civic republican discourse in Congress
through devices like campaign financing laws, and raising the level of
rationality review in an effort to snag the most egregious instances of
legislative self-dealing. 6' This focus on the legislature fits with Sunstein's
basic position that James Madison's resolution of the problem of faction
62
was to concentrate the civic virtue in indirectly elected representatives.
The civic republicanism movement is at present but one manifestation of a broader social phenomenon, the longing-after a half century of
legal positivism

63

and a decade of public choice theory-for a more grati-

fying description of the possibilities in American public life. Indeed, an
impressive array of other legal thinkers has converged on the position as
well. Starting with a search for a meaningful definition of equal protection, Professor Kenneth Karst's work has suggested that equal protection
means equality of status as participating citizens in the American constitutional community. 64 In exploring the problems of extending community through the Constitution to traditional outsiders to the public
realm-women and new immigrants-he has anchored some of the airy
debate in concrete policy proposals: affirmative action, ethnic entitlements in reapportionment, local control of bilingual education, and a due
respect for the symbolic exclusionary function of state-supported reli60. Sunstein, supra note 46; see D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST
(1984); J. POcocK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
61. Following Sunstein's lead, the student author of Comment, supra note 54, focuses exclusively on process-oriented applications like limiting the kinds of propositions that may be decided by
referendum rather than legislation and requiring a closer fit between means and ends when the legis-

lature does act.
62. Sunstein, supra note 46, at 41-45.
63. R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 287-88 (1984); see also L.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 113 (2d ed. 1985).

64. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303
(1986) [hereinafter Karst, Paths to Belonging]; Karst, Foreword Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1957 (1988).
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gious undertakings. 65 There has also been a real revival in the respectability of paternalism in the enforcement of private arrangements, like
contracts. 66 The legal concern with community-as we all know, lawyers are rarely original thinkers 67-actually reflects a major trend in the
other humanities, as epitomized by the enormous amount of attention to
68
the Bellah study of American community, Habits of the Heart.
In any case, as I said before, despite the popularity of the concerns,
most of the legal prescriptions to date are firmly in the familiar universe
of negatives and process. It is when more positive prescriptions are required that the communitarians remain elusive. Harvard Professor
Frank Michelman accurately puts this reticence down to a maidenly fear
of those democratic indiscretions: hierarchy and elitism. 69 In this he is
quite right. After all, if you're going to have a communal purpose beyond the individual purposes of the autonomous members, a hierarchy of
purpose, including the primacy of public over individual purposes, will
be necessary. 70 Moreover, if you're going to establish a hierarchy, the
71
chances are that the existing elite is going to be doing the establishing.
Finally, the establishment of a hierarchy will itself generate an elite ac72
cording to the capacity of people to effectuate the purpose.
65. Karst, Paths to Belonging, supra note 64, at 340-61.
66. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 520 n.4 (1988) (citing
Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis.
L. REV. 565, 576; Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769, 769-72; Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms
and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624-49 (1982); Kronman, Paternalismand the
Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Olsen, From False Paternalismto False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1522, 1531-34
(1986); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1169-72
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That's the thing about hierarchy and elitism. You either have too
much or too little-it's never, as Goldilocks would say, "just right." For
the last generation at least, the chief dissenting voices from the anti-elitist
American consensus have been Leo Strauss and his followers. 73 Strauss,
for 25 years Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor
at the University of Chicago (to return to home base for a moment), saw
74
the threat to liberal democracy not as totalitarianism, but as nihilism.
In their introduction to the recent symposium entitled The Crisis of LiberalDemocracy.- A StraussianPerspective,75 Professors Deutsch and Soffer summarize Strauss' thought:
The crisis of liberal democracy is best understood as a crisis of
moral foundations.
Liberal democratic regimes have failed to develop standards of
political morality by which to judge and influence actions that affect
the character and preservation of the regime itself. This failure has
contributed to the diminished conviction that there are certain moral
obligations that are binding on all who are committed to a free society
....

[L]iberal ethics... has not sufficiently recognized the connection

between the exercise of private freedom in a limited or constitutional
state and the virtues the public must exercise to remain free from
oppression. 76

Now Strauss believed that this crisis stemmed from the break with
classical political philosophy whereafter philosophers turned from a consideration of the naturally best regime to the best achievable one. 7 7 The
quarrel between the Ancients and Moderns 78 is really beyond the scope

of this Foreword. Leo Strauss himself never really resolved the question
of defining natural right io the absence of the gods or the primacy of
reason, and, anyway, we don't need to get back to first causes to speak to
the lessons of the Symposium. But just in case you think I'm getting too
far into the stratosphere, remember last year's forty-odd week tenure on
the New York Times Best Seller list of Straussian political philosopher
and Chicagoan Allan Bloom's attack on the moral relativism of Ameri79
can liberal democracy.
73. Tarcov & Pangle, Epilogue, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey 2d ed. 1972); Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature, 97
YALE L.J. 777 (1988).
74. L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 4-5 (1971).
75.

THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A STRAUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE (K.

Deutsch & W.

Soffer eds. 1987) [hereinafter CRISIS].

76. Id. at 1-2.
77.

L. STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? 43, 51, 55 (1973); L. STRAUSS, supra note

74, at 176-79.
78. For a discussion, see L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN (1968).
79. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
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There are at least three reasons why we don't need to get down to
first causes this time. First, as Strauss himself recognized, politics involves a strong measure of prudence.8 0 Since even the Ancients recognized that a certain degree of fortune is involved in the establishment of
the best regime, American liberal democracy is the "practically best contemporary political alternative."' s Second, statesmen, unlike philosophers, are actually engaged in the process of governing, and thus do not
have to-indeed, probably should not-satisfy standards of ultimate morality, but rather engage in "moral prudence."'8 2 Finally, the American
experience and the "less abstract"8 3 commentators on the American experience provide a real social and political context for considering the
problem of public virtue more than tough enough for the moment.
The problem, I suggest, is as it has been since the founding of the
Republic, and that is the problem of slavery, and its contemporary variant, racial and social caste. Which brings me back to Chicago. As Al
Polikoff reminds us, nineteen years after the filing of Dorothy Gautreaux's suit against the Chicago Housing Authority, the Chicago Tribune ran a series on the community's "new class":8 4
a lost society dwelling in enclaves of
despair and chaos that infect and
8 5
threaten the communities at large.

Two years later, the same newspaper described the state of that best hope
of liberal democracy, "primary education," 8 6 as a "cycle of failure" with
instructors who .

.

. regurgitate material from textbooks, principals

who stress class control over achievement and a bureaucracy that
pushes the children it has failed on to high school, leaving them to
drop out ....

where students with widely disparate needs are crammed

into the same classrooms, where interruptions cut instruction time and
80. See, e.g., L. STRAUSS, supra note 74, at 152.
81. CRISIS, supra note 75, at 8; see L. STRAUSS, supra note 74, at 1-8.
82. L. STRAUSS, supra note 77, at 92. I must admit to being a little relieved about this; I
certainly would not want Allan Bloom making family law decisions in my community. Hirshman,
supra note 28. But just because some destinations are undesirable doesn't mean one should scratch
the whole journey. As Harry Jaffa recently pointed out, that paradigm of judicial activism in service
of the wrong moral values, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), may be understandable as a completely amoral misconstruction of the original intent of the Framers. Jaffa, What Were
the "Original Intentions" of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 351 (1987).
83. The phrase is Stephen Salkever's. Salkever, The Crisisof LiberalDemocracy: Liberalityand
Democratic Citizenship, in CRISIS, supra note 75, at 250. Salkever includes in his earthy group Aristotle (not a well-known commentator on the American scene), but Tocqueville and the Federalist
Papers probably would suffice for our purposes.
84. Polikoff, supra note 8, at 478.
85. Id.
86. Salkever, supra note 83, at 264 (citing A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 5, 21,
238 (G. Lawrence trans. 1969)).
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87
crime is a constant worry.

As one critic of liberal democracy, Stephen Salkever, reminds us,
commentators on democracy in America as early as Tocqueville knew
that American democracy rests in part on
the absence of any large class of propertyless and destitute persons, the
fact that "wealth circulates there with incredible rapidity," and the
expenditure (contrary to official proclamations of economy in government) of "enormous sums" on "maintenance of the needy and free
education." One of the great threats to American liberty is posed by
the possible increase of economic inequality in an industrial society, a
development that for Tocqueville, as for Aristotle, threatens the possibility of liberality and
88 tends to give rise to a polity composed only of
masters and slaves.
Aristotle put it more bluntly:
[A] city full of poor and disenfranchised people is a city full of
enemies. 89

Professor Salkever concludes his reading of Aristotle in light of the
American experience:
[T]he task of [the Aristotelian political scientist interested in democracy] is twofold: to articulate forms of life that reflect the best and
worst possibilities inherent in a particular context and to examine the
laws and customs of the place with an eye to determining how they do
or do not moderate the pursuit of wealth intrinsic to all democracies. 90
I said we don't need to look outside the American experience for
opportunities for the exercise of civic virtue. Nor do we need to look
outside it for directions to virtue, even in our modernist incarnation. Democracy in America is only a couple of hundred years old, and occasions
for the critical exercise of virtue aren't all that common. 9 ' Straussian
political philosophers agree on the most obvious of them: the moral prudence of Abraham Lincoln relentlessly posing moral rectitude against
popular government until the eradication of slavery as a legal construct
was accomplished. 92 Straussian popularist Allan Bloom brings the recognition of virtue into the twentieth century when he praises the work of
the reformers who invoked federal judicial power against legal maintenance of racial caste culminating in the desegregation ruling of the
1950s. 93
87.
88.
54, 214
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Inside the Schools, Chi. Trib., May 4, 1986, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
Salkever, supra note 83, at 260 (citing A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 238,
n. 11,556-57 (G. Lawrence trans. 1969)).
Id. at 256 (discussing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III).
Id. at 257.
Ackerman, supra note 46.
Jaffa, supra note 82, at 370-72.
A. BLOOM, supra note 79, at 334.
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Kenneth Karst poses the problem after Brown:
[T]he main cause contributing to cultural separatism in America has
been the subordination of minorities.... [T]he most important technique of subordination has been the exclusion of cultural groups from
jobs and from the public life of the community .... [T]o identify the
economic effects of systematic racial discrimination, it is necessary to
look at the incomes of racial groups, and, in particular,
94 at the serious
disparities between the incomes of blacks and whites.
Put another way, "a lost society dwelling in enclaves of despair and
' 95
chaos that infect and threaten the community at large."
What to do? In his lead article in this Symposium, Peter Shane
posits an activist role for the judiciary in enunciating constitutional
rights, a role he considers morally desirable as well as consistent with
"dominant and conventional constitutional tradition. ' 96 While disclaiming that "the text, unless amended, will be treated by courts as commanding a major degree of redistribution of wealth, ' 97 Shane does
anticipate that the natural course of equality theory will put pressure on
the judiciary to declare ever-expanding rights. 98 Accordingly, even
under Shane's moderate scheme, issues of effective remedial measures
continue to be critical, and Shane suggests several avenues for a court
desiring the maximum effect consistent with maintaining a traditional
"rule of law" behavior. 99 As reflected by the courts' failure to remedy
the public housing matter, the prospect of either Shane's court (or even
the court Strauss describes)1°° actually assisting with the daunting social
problem described seems dim.
Dan Tarlock may however have hit on the solution: "Gautreaux
suggests a need to reexamine our rejection of imperfect remedies when
the issue is more wealth distribution than access to the political process." 10
' He suggests the New Jersey solution of compelling each community to accept a share of low-income residents or buy its way out with
transfer payments to the host communities. 102 In the Gautreaux scenario, the community fair share in the form of the projects would be sold
and replaced with money, used to supply existing residents with vouchers
94. Karst, Paths to Belonging, supra note 64, at 341.
95. The American Millstone, Chi. Trib., Sept. 15, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
96. Shane, Rights, supra note 18, at 551.
97. Id. at 550 (citing Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 924-27
(1986)).
98. Id. at 549 (citing A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 6-7 (P. Bradley ed. 1945);
Shane, Social Integration and the Ideology of the Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript)).
99. Shane, Rights, supra note 18.
100. Shane and Strauss disagree about whether they disagree.
101. Tarlock, supra note 24, at 578.
102. Id. at 581.
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for housing subsidies. 103
The problem with Tarlock's solution is that it addresses the real social problem and the remedy but not the recognized constitutional right.
As long as the courts are cut to the Procrustean bed of equal protection,
they will be tied to compulsory desegregation, which has failed most dramatically in Chicago, and Chicago is only emblematic of the national
failure.'°4 Housing subsidies to be spent on decent, but still segregated,
living, do not remedy an equal protection violation, and requesting such
a remedy would bring the bar of standing down on any plaintiff's head
almost as soon as the suit was filed. 105 Seen as a violation of the guarantee clause, however, Tarlock's scheme clicks nicely into place.
Here's how it would sound. The Constitution requires the United
States to guarantee to every state a republican form of government. A
republican form of government does not allow the state to take action
directed to creation or promotion of a permanent underclass separated
from the community by barriers of race and caste. Possibly, the federal
responsibility does not extend to affirmative action to reverse private economic inequalities. 106 When, however, state action in the form of public
policy and funds has been reckless toward the creation or worsening of
the barriers, as in creating and maintaining racially and socially segregated public warehouses for the poor, the United States and the states, or
their agents the cities, have violated the guarantee clause. The remedy
should be injunctive relief to tear the projects down and compensatory
damages for the residents. 107
The suggested approach opens up many other prospects, for example, the requirements of remedial funding for adequate public education. 0 8 But regardless of the application, the ultimate issue always
returns to what Strauss would call the "central human question . . .
[W]hat is the best regime for any given society?"' 1 9
That is the subject of this Symposium.

103. Id. at 582.
104. Id. at 575-76 & n.16.
105. As the Seventh Circuit just held when it dismissed the hiring claim in Shakman, to have
standing a plaintiff must assert an injury "likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Shakman v.
Dunne, 829 F.2d 1387, 1394 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
106. That really is the subject of another inquiry.
107. The New Jersey experiment, even accounting for its criticisms, suggests that damages take
the form of housing dollars; some sort of voucher system comes most readily to mind.
108. Apparently the New Jersey Court is also moving, albeit slowly, in this direction. In N.J.,
Who's Really the Boss?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
109. Tarcov & Pangle, supra note 73, at 926.

